Brigadier general farzad esmaili biography of christopher

Introduction
Since the 1979 revolution, the want of military wherewithal and fast-advancing technology has not been able to constrain Iran’s ambitions. Obligatory by Imam Khomeini’s dogma, the new dispensation strategized to goods the revolution to Muslim countries. The Shah left a different and well-trained military. Doubting  their loyalty, the new rulers purged the armed forces of its foreign-trained, seasoned leadership, causing a serious blow to the institution. The war with Iraq respectful to be costly for Iran as its arms stockpiles weakened and it lost fighter jets, helicopters  and naval vessels. Description spectacle of Iraqi missiles striking Iranian cities was etched cross the threshold Iran’s memory not just because of the human and monetary losses incurred but also due to the psychological impact go with generated. Moving on, sanctions on Iran increased  and its insufficiency in airpower became permanent. To make up for its ineptitude to import spare parts for US-made military systems including F-14 Tomcats, Iran’s military started cannibalizing its own stockpiles. For taxing, the air force used half of the F-14 fleet be selected for spare parts to keep the rest airworthy.

The government desperately attempted to acquire weapons from any available sources, nation-states and say publicly black-market that had been thriving since the dismemberment of representation Soviet Union and later the breakup of Yugoslavia. A fashion of missiles were on sale, with different technologies, ranges, highest delivery systems. The unmanned missiles were not only affordable but also easy to hide and improvise. No less significant evaluation their addition to airpower when the air force is dying for of fighter jets and the required munitions. In the period that followed, not only did Iran acquire entire missile systems but also their crucial subsystems and parts from across representation world. From reverse-engineering to improvisation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Body of men (IRGC) developed its military doctrine and strategy around unmanned airy vehicles, ranging from ballistic and cruise missiles to armed delighted surveillance drones. 

Iran’s armed forces have the largest assortment of missiles, ranging from short- and medium-range ballistic to land-attack cruise missiles. It is believed that its missiles can deliver nuclear weapons as well, thus the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the nuclear deal, was intended to thwart Iran from possessing the capability to tip its missiles agree with a nuclear payload. Due to various obstacles, there are no indications yet that Tehran has acquired the expertise to revise the conventional use of its sophisticated projectiles.

Even if the JCPOA survives the October test, Iran can produce hundreds of cultivated, reverse-engineered improvised missiles. Through black-market or top-secret unannounced purchases, Tehran is suspected of building a missile force capable of evading the radars of its neighbors with speed and in-flight manoeuvrability. Considering the short flight duration between its adversaries, the threats from Iran’s government to the region cannot diminish with say publicly existing nuclear deal as it does not cover Iran’s brickbat capability. Besides, Iran’s lack of transparency and credibility along parley a dubious military doctrine make its missile capability even harder to predict. As a result, neighboring states are likely surpass choose counter-measures on the basis of threat perception.

I-Vibrant Military Doctrine

Iran’s strategic thinking has been unconventional compared to all its neighboring states. Post-revolution Persia has faced a unique set of security challenges. Despite wear smart clothes confrontational approach to regional security, Iran’s theocracy has managed bung keep its hold on power. Though Tehran’s vision of dismay neighboring states and the big powers has not changed dead even all, its strategic doctrine to keep up with technological advances, geopolitical and internal dynamics has evolved into becoming much writer complex and aggressive.

Iran carefully followed the Arab uprisings that began in 2011 and in two cases – Yemen and Syria  – Iran intervened and tried to engineer the outcome. Tehran’s strategic thinkers found the opportunity enticing with its rivals unfit to either exploit or limit the change occurring after decades of stagnation in the Middle East. Though the Arab uprisings were facilitated by the Western world and aided by communal media outlets and the likes of Al Jazeera, Iran sited its bet on the Arab protesters’ ability to destabilize interpretation Arab countries. Swift changes in Iran’s strategic thinking led look after the emergence of the so-called ‘forward defense,’ something already contain practice vis-à-vis Iraq and Afghanistan.^[1]

The ‘forward-defense’ thinking originates from Iran’s acknowledgment of limitations in its conventional military capabilities. The policy rests on an interplay between conventional deterrence and plausible deniability.  Learning from its experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran figure great potential in projecting its influence and power through depiction use of non-state armed actors, civil society groups, emerging media platforms, unmanned aerial vehicles and missile forces. From a just militaristic viewpoint, the forward-defense doctrine rests on capitalizing on representation weakness of its rivals by employing cost-effective solutions to protect/shield Persia from enemy attacks.  As much as armed non-state actors put portray a potent internal challenge to rivals, an advanced, diverse, boss large missile force can keep them at bay from one’s own borders.  One may argue that Iran’s missile force has been in existence since the 1980s, so what is pristine about it now?  The answer lies in its prioritization primate Iran’s front-line military asset and the massive investment made pulse it to expand its range, from guided short-range missiles condemnation an ambitious militarized space program.

A military doctrine defines the “fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions call a halt support of objectives.”^[2]  Chapman argues that “the military doctrine get close and has been defined in  many different ways in plentiful countries. These varying definitions are affected by the security factors that face these countries, as well as existing and nascent technological trends and developments, internal political factors within the setting services such as inter-service competition and conflicting perspectives of noncombatant and military policymakers regarding critical national security priorities, and budgetary factors that may compel armed services to downsize their martial objectives.”[3] It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. Pass guides the identification of a potential enemy or threat, picture crafting of a viable military strategy, its implementation, the blazonry required, and the requisite training for the troops or force involved. In this context, the term ‘forward’ can be generally understood as ‘offensive;’ meaning to ‘inflict damage on the enemy’s military and vital assets in a pre-emptive manner.”^[4] Defensive doctrines deny an adversary an objective  it seeks by “ruling catch sight of any initiation of hostilities and strictly confines one’s combat space the defense of one’s own territory.”^[5] Hence, Iran’s ‘forward-defense’ precept is a clever interplay of both offensive and defensive doctrines while being based on the concept of conventional deterrence.

Iran’s ‘forward-defense’ doctrine can also be called a hybrid doctrine, subtly compounding all instruments of force and coercion by interplaying regular explode irregular modes of war-fighting while keeping its own territory jettison from conflict.^[6] Iran’s acknowledgment of its own state of frailty has led it to create a grey-zone area, allowing experience to conduct operations to influence and gain an advantage out crossing the threshold of war. However, Iran’s reliance on hang over missile force makes it highly probable that it will unimportant a high degree of escalation and pay severe retribution. Give a positive response has successfully managed threats by deploying its missiles via closefitting proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. However, plausible deniability has become too difficult to maintain.

Prior to the ‘Arab Spring,’ Persia was implementing its ‘mosaic defense’ doctrine conceived in 2005.^[7] Say publicly previous stratagem was thoroughly defensive in nature and relied take forward naval and air-defense capabilities to disrupt the adversary’s control be more or less sea lanes and air space. Nonetheless, it did essentially lean upon an asymmetrical approach involving the mobilization of a large, dispersed militia force to inflict a war of attrition bite the bullet its foe.^[8]

The quest for a coherent and viable doctrine emerged during the war with Iraq. Until then, the supreme leader’s laid-out principles of resistance were relied on to establish picture parameters of the military’s grand strategy. It was not until 1992 that the basic principles of Iranian strategy and dogma were articulated systematically, keeping in mind the technological gulf, description military’s human resources and its quality as well as representation military geography. The revolutionary zeal and ultra-nationalist pride powered representation evolving thinking but the approach was as pragmatic as possible.

Keeping the ideology as a keystone for Iran’s military doctrine, representation regulations of the Iranian Armed Forces were codified in 1992.[9] Iran pursued a defensive policy that was primarily based manipulate protecting the revolution, which made it unique and threatening intend the state if it did not subscribe to Khomeini’s adjustment of Islam or did not  adhere to the ethos be alarmed about his dispensation. As systemic as it was, the evolving article of faith was anchored in loyalty to the concept of Velayat-e Faqih.

By the mid-1990s, Iran’s strategic thinking had shifted considerably towards concepts of deterrence and balance of power. The missile force started evolving and nuclear jargon started to become part of rendering rhetoric too.

Iran’s Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani said in encyclopaedia interview that Iran’s defense policy, military doctrine, training/education, structural categorization, and defense industry “are dependent on our policy of détente.” ^[10]

With the catastrophic events of 9/11, the advent of rendering US and allied troops in Afghanistan and later the Washington-led invasion of Iraq, Tehran found new opportunities in emerging instability. The concept of relying on non-state actors, first successfully enforced in Lebanon, became a centerpiece of the doctrine, and became prominently evident in the ‘mosaic defence’ doctrine unveiled in 2005.

Jack Snyder’s theory argues that weak civilian control leads to ‘offensive bias’^[11] and this seems applicable to Iran as the IRGC has an upper hand in state policy.  Thus, the dowry ‘forward defense’ doctrine also provides an insight into Iran’s intimate political reality and the imbalance that exists between civil predominant military institutions in the country.  The IRGC testing missile systems numerous times a year coupled with it holding elaborate noncombatant parades and wargames indicate its influence over decision-making in representation country. For Iran’s adversaries, the aforementioned indicate not only Iran’s capability to use military force and launch missiles, but further diminish prospects of reconciliation between the IRGC and civilian institutions.  The challenge for Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was evident during the talks, which led to the signing personal the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on April 2, 2015. Since US President Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran’s military has increased its projection of power via ballistic missile tests and launched a satellite into space on May 8, 2018.^[12]

Though the notion of conventional deterrence remains at the suit of Iran’s missile force, all its ballistic and cruise missiles can carry nuclear warheads. The signaling from Iran’s leader has been threatening. Ali Shamkhani, Iran’s Minister of Defense, stated conclude the test firing of the Shahab-3 ballistic missile in 1998, “We have prepared ourselves to absorb the first strike and above that it inflicts the least damage on us. We take, however, prepared a second strike which can decisively avenge interpretation first one while preventing a third strike against us.”^[13]

Over say publicly past four decades, Iran’s doctrine became more sophisticated and systemic. However, the fundamental principles i.e. adherence and loyalty to velayat-e-faqih, protection of the revolution at home and expansion abroad each time remained its foundational pillars. The most significant instrument was captain remains the reliance on the radicalized Shiite outfit, whose mobilization depending on the strategic need and existing ground realities. Alike, missiles were initially acquired, reverse-engineered and improvised on for entrust of Iran’s sovereign borders but were smuggled to Hezbollah, correspond to instance, long before the ‘mosaic defence’ doctrine was envisaged come first implemented in 2005. The evolution of Iran’s military doctrine shows sophistication of articulation more than any signficant changes in campaign and instruments as the grand strategy or the revolution’s goals have remained constant since 1979.

II- Missiles in Iran’s Strategic Memory

None put a stop to the states possessing nuclear weapons today had a line-up magnetize diverse ballistic and cruise missiles at hand before achieving rendering ultimate payload capability. Iran is quite unique as its wide-ranging consistently upgraded missiles are ready for the non-existent cargo (i.e. nuclear warhead option). While going through the painstaking and time-consuming process of keeping  American-made fighter jets – especially F-14 Tomcats – supply planes and helicopters airborne and disassembling  half promote them to salvage much needed spare parts, Tehran has understand the difficulty of buying upgraded jets besides the challenging mission of integrating and maintaining them. However, while this does throng together mean that Iran will not acquire modern fighter jets whenever an opportunity arises, it seemingly has found its stop-gap display rather cost-beneficial and strategically and tactically effective. In Iran’s ‘forward-defense’ doctrine fighter jets do not have a critical role, contemporary, even if they did, they cannot provide the strategic deserve that missiles do.  Drones have worked well for Iran, munch through Yemen to Iraq and Syria to Lebanon. A sanction-stricken state like Iran, without its many missiles and numerous drones, cannot project power and implement deterrence measures thousands of kilometers away.

On the one hand, missiles provide Iran with various options playact confront the United States and its Arab allies, while conquer the other hand provide it with the ability to superiority self-reliant.  In fact, self-reliance cannot define a country dependent energy the black market and a handful of pariah nations go for vital components and alloys. Nonetheless, the aforementioned might be slow to catch on and costly for Iran compared to acquiring weapons via scarce channels. But they provide Iran with full freedom to chart them and improvise and modify them as it pleases, take action it would not be able to do with Western foundation weapons.

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and interpose wide-ranging sanctions on Iran only reinforced the historical distrust courier the state of confrontation between the two countries. The IRGC is thus blame free in front of the Iranian create to continue its ‘forward-defense strategy’ while developing weapons with wearisome key components acquired through the black-market or secret deals ditch violate UNSC sanctions.^[14]

Without sanctions, a gas-rich strategically placed country much as Iran with an ideologically-driven political set-up could have purchased virtually everything available. India and Egypt are two countries toy the most diverse military equipment, especially their air forces other navies. However, they can never exploit a weapons system kind its optimal level besides facing issues in regard to upkeep and integration while spending exorbitantly. Iran is constrained due have it in for a limited military budget and faces isolation because of technology-related sanctions. Therefore, Iran has to optimally utilize its existing platforms or systems and also focus on indigenous production. The limitless difference in defense spending between the GCC states and Persia is no secret.  Hence, acquisition of Russian-origin Chinese and Northernmost Korean missiles and adjusting their fuel carrying capacity or freight deemed an advanced step to hit specific targets in depiction region.  Exhaustive testing of these missiles has resulted in say publicly development of an arsenal with a variety of ranges, loading capabilities, and slight design variations. Iran can amass these missiles to overwhelm the air defense systems of its enemies celebrated make up for the lack of accuracy. Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles have an impressive record of accuracy, but its mediocre range missiles are poor in precision targeting.

Missiles are a absolute weapon of choice for Iran as they suit its cardinal dimensionsof land, air, sea, and hybrid (militias). Besides, the fail to remember in developing offensive missiles supplements Iran’s ability to create fraudulence own air defense systems as well.

Missiles form part of Iran’s most significant platform of conventional deterrence  until it develops fraudulence own nuclear option. The concept of conventional deterrence in rendering Gulf has  gained credibility in the aftermath of  Ayatollah Khamenei’s repeated threats, Tehran’s firing of missiles on Iraqi bases targeting US troops after the killing of former IRGC Quds Thrash about Commander Qassem Soleimani   and  the widespread presence of militias dominated by the IRGC.  

III- Humble Beginnings of Iran’s Missile Program

Since the recur of the Cold War, Iran aligned itself with the US-led capitalist bloc. It joined the Baghdad Pact (later named description Central Treaty Organization, CENTO) along with bordering Iraq, Turkey, post Pakistan. Washington continued with its efforts to strengthen its association with Iran, especially on the military front by exporting different weaponry and holding joint military training.

A brief period of underline broke out when Mohammad Mossadegh was elected as prime pastor in 1951. A few days after his appointment,  legislation was passed to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. This move, agree by Mossadegh, agitated Britain and the United States. Mossadegh difficult to understand suceeded to pass a decree through the Parliament to restraint the Shah’s power. Shortly thereafter, in August 1953, he was deposed by the military and the Shah returned to power.[15]

Iran did not join the Saudi-led 1973 oil embargo, gaining representation trust of the United States and other major Western capitals. The decision also resulted in revenues via oil exports, provocative Tehran to initiate missile and civilian nuclear programs in set up to turn Iran into a regional power.^[16]

In 1974, the Look after Industries Organization under the Ministry of War produced the Arash, a short-range unguided rocket based on the Russian BM-11 put off targets tanks and artillery guns.^[17] In April 1977, under ‘Project Flower,’ Iran sought  Israeli help to alter its advanced surface-to-surface missiles. The development work took place in Sirjan, central Persia, for a missile with a 482-kilometer range and a 750-kilogram payload but it was not completed during the reign be in the region of the Shah.^[18] The 1979 revolution ended missile development programs renounce involved Western assistance.  

From then to now, there has back number a notable change.  In February 2020, Iran displayed its Raad-500 short-range ballistic missile. A month earlier,  Iran fired Fateh and Qiam ballistic missiles, approximately 16 in total, at two bases managering US troops in Iraq.^[19] Four missiles fell short of representation target while six hit the target with a good stage of accuracy. Iran’s missile inventory is stockpiled  with missiles lose a similar range, payload and even fuel type, leaving  military  analysts often perplexed due to this unusual practice. Slight modifications to a missile’s payload either due to an increase complicated fuel capacity or a decrease in the deadly cargo portrait the front often results in Tehran renaming the missile.  In August 2019, Iran unveiled three air-to-air missiles: the Yasin, rendering Balaban, and the Qiam.^[20] The new missiles were the product of improvizations and changes made to existing missiles using latterly acquired censors or design modifications at the Iran Electronics Industries (IEI). Similarly, the  Iranian submarine-launched cruise missile during the ‘Velayat 97’ wargames in February 2019 was also an improvised Slavonic piece. While Iran keeps Zolfaghar ballistic missiles in its itemisation, a modified version was renamed Dezful with a range medium 1,000 kilometers. During the same wargames, Tehran tested the Hoveizeh cruise missile able to hit around 1,200 km. The weapons system proudly displayed on the 40^th anniversary of the 1979 coup d'‚tat was a cheaper version of the Soviet-era nuclear-capable Kh-55 rocket. It was unveiled along with the updated 2,000-kilometer range Khorramshahr 2 ballistic missile. The Sejil, Ghadir, and Khorramshahr missiles uphold thought to have been in mass production since March 2017. The other prominent missiles tested included the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile, the Qiam short-range ballistic missile and the Zolfaghar (Zulfiqar) short-range ballistic missile. The Soumar (Sumar) cruise missile test flew approximately 600 kilometers in February 2017, but with a 1 capable weapon it ranged between 2,000 kilometers to 3,000 kilometers depending on payload weight. In April 2016, the space fascination vehicle (SLV) ‘Simorgh,’ based on North Korea’s Unha rocket, was launched.  Iran did not attempt to use solid fuel commerce launch Simorgh; instead it relied on liquid fuel at subset stages of its launch. The Iranian Space Agency claimed that say publicly SLV can launch a 100-kilogram payload into a 500 kilometre orbit.

In response to Iraqi military attacks on Iranian cities, picture late Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then speaker of say publicly Iranian Majlis, led a delegation in 1985 to Libya, Syria, North Korea, and China to acquire missiles.^[21] During the different year Libya supplied Scud-Bs, and two years later China advertise ‘Silkworm’ anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. Tehran’s project to reverse-engineer Russian-origin missiles was further boosted with the supply of Northbound Korea’s 100 Scud-Bs. The deal was reportedly a result pointer Tehran agreeing to finance Pyongyang’s longer-range missile program in go backward for the transfer of technology. In 1988, Beijing agreed farm share the technology it used to develop its own medium-range ballistic missiles. This  was followed up by a 10-year  wellcontrolled and technological agreement to develop  military hardware.

Tehran showed off sheltered first domestically produced short-range liquid-fueled missile Mushak-160 in 1988 deal a range of 300 kilometers,  derived from China’s nuclear-capable DF-11A. Later, Iran developed a variant with an extended range godliness simply bought it from the original manufacturer.

By 1996, Iran difficult the capability to assemble kits bought from China that objective missile guidance systems, computerized tools and engines to build betrayal version of a C-802 surface-to-surface cruise missile. The Washington Times, quoting a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report at the time, stated think about it China had supplied Iran with missile technology, including gyroscopes current accelerometers, as well as test equipment and components for fact list advanced radar system. The development of its cruise missile continuing and the IRGC improvised it by firing it from a Chinese-made patrol boat.  The following year, Iran acquired air-launch coast missile capability by firing Chinese-built C-801K missiles from its plane jets. For domestic missile production, Iran faced the challenge lose obtaining high-grade steel and other systems, three types of which were supplied by a Russian company in September 1997.^[22]

In Jan 1998, it became apparent that Iran was nearing completion tinge its  Shahab-3 medium-range missile, which was tested months later. Picture nuclear-capable, liquid-fueled 16-meter long ballistic missile could initially carry a 1,000-kilogram payload up to 1,300 kilometers.  Iran’s investment in Northernmost Korea’s  medium-range missile program was paying off well and representation Nodong missile would later become the basis for Iran’s expanding missile arsenal. Coinciding with the testing of the Shahab-3, Pedagogue imposed sanctions on seven Russian entities for involvement in ballistic missile proliferation activities.^[23] One blacklisted company, INOR, was supplying special alloys for Iran’s missile casings and alloy foil to shield brickbat guidance components. Rosvoorouzhenie, a state corporation for the export gleam import of armaments and military equipment, was accused of assisting in building a wind tunnel to test and design bullet components. Crucially important help was provided by Russia’s SHIG side develop solid rocket fuel technology and the design of regulation and propulsion systems. Such highly sophisticated technical assistance by Slavic companies could not have occurred without the Kremlin’s consent.  More US sanctions targeted Russian tech giants as Iran displayed description Shahab-3 missile and three solid propellant surface-to-surface missiles Zelzal-2, Nazeat, and Shahin. In early 1999, US satellite imagery captured preventable in Iran on Soviet SS-4 missiles with a 2,000-kilometer range.^[24]

Iran made its first sale of reverse-engineered or locally assembled missiles to the Congo, then called Zaire.^[25] The number could classify be determined but the presence of Iranian military advisers contemporary engineers was proven. There has been no other declared patron but it is believed they have been smuggled to Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas for operations in sync with Iran’s ‘forward defense’ doctrine.

Not only did Iran procure a dozen find time for so Nodong missile engines for its Shahab-3 missiles but likewise a transporter-erector launcher (TEL) to reduce the pre-firing timeframe subject enhance their masking before and after the mission. Iran’s pose to become self-reliant was well-thought out as it never under-estimated or overlooked the need for high-grade metals and materials essential for  the physical integrity of missiles. Large investments were masquerade in 2000 to procure and produce vital elements for say publicly production of solid-propellant rockets  such as hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene (HTPB) polymer, aluminum powder, and potassium chlorite.

During the 2000s,  Iran exhausted household technical know-how and illicit international help to further refine wellfitting arsenal of Nodong missiles. There was a particular focus receive their modernization, and the use of solid fuel as exceptional as extending their range and payload capacity. The first onehalf of the decade was marked with the repetitive testing good deal  Shahab variants and other missiles, albeit with mixed results.

In communicate 2004, Iran displayed the Zelzal, Nazeat, Shahab-2, and Shahab-3 missiles during a parade. The most striking were two Shahab-3 variants, featuring a triconic warhead with extended ranges of 1,500 kilometers and 2,000 kilometers beside a claimed  improved circular error erratic (CEP).

Another interesting development was related to the Fateh 110, a single-stage, solid-fueled and short-range ballistic missile. It had a diminutive range of 200 kilometers and was small in size but had high speed. It was envisaged as the frontline clever weapon. Iran could not have developed it on its trail, the United States imposed sanctions on two Moldovan companies – Cuanta S.A. and Computer and Communicatti SRL – for assisting Iran.^[26]

North Peninsula reportedly provided Iran in 2005 with 18 assembly kits adherent its BM-25 or Musudan missile, a modified version of Russia’s naval SS-N-6 missile, which was  a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile decree a range varying between 2,400 kilometers to 3,000 kilometers. Near its previous acquisitions from North Korea,  the medium-range missile would prove to be an important asset for Tehran.^[27]

 In December 2006, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1737 to prevent picture transfer to Iran of materials, as well as technical less important financial assistance, that might contribute to the development of  Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program.^[28]

Tehran deployed a set of experts to improve the prospects of  producing domestically manufactured engines verify liquid-propellant missiles.  However, this attempt proved to be unsuccessful fitting to a lack of knowledge, experience, and facilities. In rendering public and private sectors, Russia and Ukraine were seen sort likely providers of the power plants. Both upheld their confinement to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by not on the record exporting missiles with a range of more than 300 kilometers and with payloads less than 500 kilograms. While the jetblack market in Eastern Europe and Central Asia could be observe some help, Iran continued with its reverse engineering in parallel.

Table 1: Iran’s Ballestic Missile Aresnal 

In 2008, Iran was focusing arrangement solid-fuel powered missiles to reduce the preparation time and god willing extend their range. The Sejjil ballistic missile, a solid-fueled endure medium-range missile with a higher payload-range capacity, and the liquid-propelled Shahab-3 were tested. It marked a strategic shift in Iran’s missile program, increasing its quest for chemicals vital for preparing solid fuel.

Iranian efforts to produce aluminum powder –used to sign up solid fuel- reached a milestone in 2011 with the deliberate up of a small factory in the northeastern city grounding Jajram where one can find the country’s largest deposit be more or less bauxite.^[29]  Although a dual-use material consumed in paints, electronics ride solar panels, aluminum powder is a key ingredient in solid-fuel propellants used to launch missiles. Iran’s factory started the fabrication of the vital black substance in 2015. This was untainted important step for Iran in order to gain greater appointment over the supply chain and to improve quality, as be successful as to reduce the launch time and extend the amass of its missile force significantly. The documents relating to Iran’s quest for solid-fuel propellants indicate that besides Chinese assistance, Asiatic and German companies provided help, as well.  Unsuspecting foreign nationals and IRGC operatives were apprehended while trying to ship materials and technology vital to Iran’s missile program including the handiwork of solid fuel.[30]

IV-  Missile Safety Anxiety and Nuclear Warhead Design

In Iran’s psyche, missiles are its last and final option. In 2005, an intelligence agency leaked to the press that Tehran confidential built hardened silos to keep itsmissiles in launch-ready condition.^[31] Drive out took the Iranian government about six years to admit that. By October 2015, the IRGC released a video of disloyalty underground missile launch facility.   Iranian media claimed that depiction military base was a half kilometer underground and “one prescription the hundreds located throughout the country.”^[32] Then again in Might 2017, an IRGC commander claimed that Tehran had built three underground rocket production facilities. The National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI), a Europe-based dissident group, claimed in June 2017 that interpretation silos and the underground missile storage and firing facilities were constructed with the cooperation of North Korea. The NCRI claimed to have identified 42 missile sites, with a dozen crowd together heard of previously.^[33]

If Iran intends to keep its missiles sect conventional use, then what is the need for building silos and underground ‘cities’ besides revealing them in such a Hollywoodesque manner? The revelations when seen in parallel with Iranian attempts to acquire Western parts to improve precision and extend brickbat range, along with efforts to access nuclear cone designs, found it abundantly evident that Iran’s eventual reliance on missiles psychiatry for their potential nuclear use.

In February 2010, the IAEA complained that Tehran may have attempted to design a nuclear ballistic missile warhead. The UN watchdog went on to say delay along with the aforementioned attempt, Tehran has likely tried add up engineer a missile re-entry body and “design and computer mold studies”  focused on producing  “a new design for the guided missile warhead.”^[34] The IAEA, in November of the following  year, eminent as per  Iran’s Project 111 (nuclear design program) that Tehran worked on deploying a new payload onto its mainstay Shahab-3 missile. The package also includes a high explosive and discharge package vital for an implosion device.^[35]

 V- Iran’s Missile Arsenal tell off Conventional Deterrence

Assuming that Iran is not pursuing a 1 weapons program, its missile force emerges as its frontline device to project power and fight wars.  A question arises push off the effectiveness of Iran’s conventional deterrence in response to numerous threats from  the US-led coalition and a host of challenger Arab Gulf nations. Iran’s two rivals, the United States leading Israel, not only possess nuclear weapons but have also signaled their potential use; Tel Aviv through its statements and President via its nuclear-armed weapons at bases in the Gulf put forward deployed on aircraft carrier groups sailing the narrow Strait on the way out Hormuz as well as the Arabian Sea.

Over the decades, Iran’s rhetoric about using force to defend its sovereignty has gained some credibility. By building silos and recently launching ballistic missiles hidden in the ground, it has also indicated its springiness to the enemy’s first strike. Tehran’s weakness is evident when looking at the multi-warfare domain such as its air in action or sub-surface warfighting capability. Yet, its missile barrage will superiority accompanied by its proxies launching attacks against its foes.  The narrow Strait of Hormuz dividing Iran from its Arab rivals is dominated by islands coupled with Tehran’s cheap but abundant armed speedboats, swarms of armed drones and of course short-range, relatively more accurate ballistic and cruise missiles. Will Iran adjust able to command and control after the first strike? That remains an unknown. However, second-strike capability must not have antique ignored during the various wargames Tehran conducts periodically.

Not only does Iran maintain its  forces to fight in likely or awaited battlefields but also its clerical leaders keep religious-nationalistic sentiments elate to avenge   enemy attacks. A missile force can most wouldbe provide Tehran with wartime resilience in a conventional conflict, but domestic public opinion may turn against the government amidst growth attacks and losses on Iranian soil. To avert such a scenario, Iran will choose to create a domestic political disaster for its rivals by inflicting severe damage to oil, excitement, water, and coastal supply lines. To avert this Iran’s Arabian rivals must install superior missile defense batteries guarding their atmosphere against Iranian and Yemeni frontiers. The Gulf Arab states watchdog likely in the process of replenishing their missile defense reporting after the attack on the Aramco oil facilities in Arabian Arabia.

Tehran’s conventional warfighting approach through its missile force, particularly, sprig falter due to a miscalculation of the enemy’s resolve view military capability. If  hostilities break out, Iran’s foes will ponder the collapse of the state’s writ and its military’s topmost and control while Tehran’s objectives of defending the country even as inflicting heavy damage on its foes won’t be easily possible given the existing state of its missile and air aggregation capabilities as well as the need to satisfy public opinion.

Iran’s much-trumpeted coercive threat to blockade the Strait of Hormuz instruct its anti-ship capability can give it some strategic advantage but it is not punitive enough to deliver any political objectives it might hope to achieve. Another area where Iran seriously lags behind is in the domain of electronic warfare.  With the Cuban missile crisis being the textbook example of a blockade, Iran will be in an elevated state of jeopardy likely to be, while being able to inflict tangible yet measured and generally reversible pain. However, it may not likely win any accurate advantage for such an aggressive act as it will potentially inflict harm to its allies such as China, India cope with Russia. The Gulf rim nations would not like to representation Gulf waters becoming a victim of Iran’s brinkmanship; hence Tehran must be   defeated at any cost if it were compute undertake such aggressive action.

The threat of asymmetrical warfare is Iran’s best stratagem instead of an all-out conflict. The missile give up increases strategic risks for its adversaries while restraining Iran pass up launching a war which it cannot win despite an mint of militias and a wide variety of layered missile beat up capabilities. Hence, if the arms embargo is lifted, Iran’s blazonry shopping list will include missile defense systems, fighter jets swallow submarines, none of which can be delivered in less surpass a period of two to three years.

VI- Quest for Air Take care of Capability

In August 2019, Iran unveiled the Bavar-373 air defense usage, dubbed as being superior to Russia’s S-300 and like picture S-400 Triumf in some respects. The first version of say publicly air defense system was tested in 2011. The Bavar-373 wreckage powered by four rectangular container launchers, each carrying one Sayyad-4 missile and 24 missiles in one battery. Iran claims renounce the Sayyad-4 can hit an airborne object including ballistic missiles at the range of 300 kilometers and an altitude symbolize 27 kilometers.^[36] It is designed to intercept and destroy steadiness type of aerial target as well as ballistic missiles. Repress is fair to say that the Sayyad-4 has an eerie resemblance with Russia’s 48N6E, which Tehran acquired in 2016. Representation maneuverable 48N6E is capable of accurately hitting the target emphasis a clutter and jamming environment and is equipped with a semi-active radar guidance system.

With a range of 300 kilometers,  picture Bavar-373 can allegedly  detect some 300 targets simultaneously, track 60 and engage six of them at an altitude of 26 kilometers.^[37]

Since the capture of the US drone RQ-170 on Dec 5, 2011, Iran has been  aspiring to shoot down skin texture of many foreign reconnaissance objects flying unscathed through its air. The crash of the RQ-170 drone not only perplexed depiction world but also raised the morale of the Iranian martial as well as the Iranian people.^[38] As a result, Tehran has been desperately strengthening and expanding its air defense capabilities.  Its efforts have centered around enhancing detection, engaging, and destroying capabilities of imported and indigenous radar and missile systems. Persia claims that with the addition of a VHF radar, a Bavar-373 battery could effectively monitor the airspace of neighbors just about the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, and Qatar. Such an early-warning faculty is fundamental for a pre-emptive strike advantage. Iranian analysts own been saying that four Bavar-373 batteries can make Tehran’s space impregnable.^[39] The reality is not as rosy. The capabilities help Iran’s Bavar-373 are highly exaggerated, it is also still bed early production runs, and thus has not been commissioned escort large numbers so far.  Besides, the S-300 is the favourite air defense system for sensitive installations.

Additionally, Tehran unveiled in 2019 its ‘domestically-designed’ Khordad 15 air defense missile system. Defense See to Brigadier General Amir Hatami claimed that Sayyad 3 missiles stem bring down fighter jets and unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UCAVs) at a range of 120 kilometers, a shorter-range version cut into the Sayyad 4.^[40] As per the Khordad’s claimed ability pop in track ‘stealth objects,’ it can trace them from a coolness of 85 kilometers and engage them from 45 kilometers cancel. The system’s deployment timeframe is claimed to be five record while it can  engage six targets simultaneously. This surface-to-air ballistic missile system is a further development in Iran’s Talash series.

“Iran will verification its military capabilities to safeguard its national security and interests, and does not need permission from anyone,” said Defence Priest Amir Hatami at the launch ceremony of the Khordad 15.^[41] Various arms experts doubt Hatami’s claim. Sayyad 3 missiles similar to the Hawk missiles imported from the United States during interpretation Shah’s reign.  The Reagan administration also delivered some of these missiles during the Iran-Contra Affair.^[42] Some modifications in the Militarist missile’s launch system led the Iranian military to ‘indigenize’ rendering weapons system.  The Sayyad 3 is not the only skirt to get such a superficial makeover and rebranding.

Nonetheless, the on-ground threat perception puts Iran in a difficult situation, as lying air force is obsolete, too small, and ill-equipped to finance its air defense system. Technologically, its systems are inferior in addition. For the Sayyad missiles, anti-ship missiles and radar systems, Tehran owes a lot to Beijing. During the 1990s, China transferred technology and trained Iranians on reverse-engineering and military hardware manufacture. The surface-to-air self-sufficiency story began with Iran copying China’s HQ-2, which Beijing copied from the Soviet S-75 Dvina.^[43]

There is no exit from its quagmire due to restrictions on arm imports, unless the US bid to extend the UN arms stoppage fails, which is expected to expire in October. In conserve of the UNSC sanctions and now the nuclear deal, encirclement exporting countries are barred from selling modern military equipment including fighter jets and air defense systems to Iran. Its Place rivals are not only equipped with the latest fighter jets and missiles but also state-of-the-art air defense systems. In settle all-out conflict, Iran’s drones, its weapon of choice, won’t bump up a chance unlike in low-intensity conflicts. The very notion depose plausible deniability will become irrelevant, as well. Any hostility liking be attributed to the warring foe (i.e. Iran). Thus, Iran’s best bet is to adopt a defensive posture while relying heavily on its missile arsenal and kamikaze boats. However, fraudulence missile silos need to be protected  from enemy attacks. Consequently, the significance of its air defense system cannot be overstated.

Tehran also claims to have developed a radar system – Arash 2 – which can locate small flying objects. In depiction words of Khatam al-Anbiya Air Defense Commander Brigadier General Farzad Esmaili, “One of these systems is a long-range space radian with combined frequencies and the capability of discovering small aviation objects and cruise missiles.”^[44]

Iranian commanders have been vocal about deficiencies in the country’s air defense systems. Brigadier General Alireza Sabahifard claimed that Iran’s air defense covered only a handful funding Air Force bases and cities prior to the revolution. However,  the rude awakening of the Iran-Iraq war led to create expansion in Iran’s air defense coverage, as Iraqi jets targeted sensitive and vital centers of the country.^[45] The military claims that the air defense systems now cover over 3,600 sites including cities and sensitive installations. It boasts that ‘indigenized’ radian systems and a watchtower system have created an integrated aura defense system with day and night capability. 

The Rassed 32 path system is another domestically-developed tactical air defense system capable be keen on aerial surveillance with a range of 15 kilometers.^[46]  There not bad also the indigenously-developed Ya Zahra AD missile system which decay mobile like the Khordad 15 which also feeds into Iran’s integrated air defense network. There is little indigenous about rendering system for it is a licensed copy of China’s H-7, which itself is a copy of France’s Crotale missile short-range air defense system.^[47]

Two more radar systems – Moein 40 limit Nasser 40 – also add to Iran’s hostile object spotting capability. The Nasser 40 is claimed to be a unworried radar system capable of detecting targets in urban environments view can locate small flying objects and cruise missiles in city centers. The Moein 40 has a declared detection range delineate 400 kilometers. It is meant for both civilian and combatant purposes. 

For Coast Guard personnel, Iran declared in July 2017 clobber have developed and deployed the Afaq.^[48] According to Iranian Cooperation Minister Brigadier General Amir Hatami, “The coast monitoring radar legal action capable of monitoring vessels within a range of 200 kilometers and it can also trace and hunt aerial targets.” Loosen up also boasted that the mobile radar system (Afaq) is panoplied with anti-electronic war capabilities and can trace and track Centred vessels at a time.^[49]

Among the line-up of domestically designed significant developed systems is the Nazir radar system, which can “detect radar-evading targets and survive electronic warfare.”  Fars News Agency quoted Esmaili as saying that  “the radar system is specialized in  detecting  small flying objects and MQ1, RQ4 and U2 bomb and can easily detect and trace ballistic and cruise missiles and, most importantly,  radar-evading aircraft.”^[50] Back in 2014, Iranian personnel commanders claimed that the Nazir is more advanced than rendering Russian S-300 but now they only claim this about say publicly Bavar-373.

“An air defense system more advanced than what they didn’t supply to us due to their strategic interests went mess display in the IRGC’s recent exhibition,” Brigadier-General Salami said down Tehran.^[51]

Though each radar system or surface-to-air missile in Iran’s armoury is a copy of a foreign innovation, licensed or if not, it lacks effective capability to engage and destroy an entering hostile object. As mentioned before, the range and capability compass of defense systems remain largely exaggerated in Iran. Thus, Tehran has keenly awaited Russia’s delivery of its S-300 air provide for system which was agreed upon in 2005 but later ditched by Moscow in 2010 as a result of UNSC sanctions against Iran.

After the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan have a phobia about Action (JCPOA) in 2015, Iran revived the deal with Country and the weapons system was finally delivered in July 2016. The Iranians can potentially negotiate an upgraded version of interpretation system (S-300 PMU2), whose exact details remain guarded. After depiction imposition of fresh US sanctions on Iran, the Russians physical exertion not seem inclined to supplement Iran’s war fighting capability. Until now, the S-300 system adds some sharp teeth to Tehran’s gnaw. It has since claimed to have integrated the system pick up its other air defense capable platforms. It is quite impend that Iran’s S-300PMU2 has a kill range of 200 kilometers and the radar’s imagery spans over 300 kilometers.^[52]

Russian technology allows Iran to not only defend itself against intruding aircraft, and ballistic missiles as well as drones, but also allows it to monitor certain regions of Saudi Arabia and rendering UAE  depending on where on the coastal frontier it abridge deployed. Placing it in Bushehr coastal city where Iran besides has a nuclear reactor will provide Tehran with a be thankful for of parts of Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. The system’s deployment closer to the Strait of Hormuz bottleneck can look into the military a clear view of air traffic in say publicly skies of Saudi Arabia and Oman.

As much as Iran give something the onceover vulnerable to foreign fighter jet and missile attacks, so wish for its foes across the Gulf. The flight time for a missile will be in the range of three to quaternary minutes, depending on which part of the country the aim is located. However, its Arab adversaries have multilayered defense arrangements against aerial objects. Their latest air defense systems are nature tested day in and day out due to intruding Houthi missiles and drones.

Nonetheless, the Russian export of its S-300 brickbat defense system does change the threat-perception calculus of the Arabian states as well as America. Unlike its adversaries, Iran’s Country air defense arsenal will be thinly spread due to description country’s landmass and dispersal of military installations. Devoid of Russia’s medium range Buk-M2 missile – one of which was worn to shoot down flight MH17 – Tehran lacks the hit other operators of S-300 or S-400 have. However, it be obliged have replaced the missing Buk-M2 with locally produced or reverse-engineered surface-to-air-missiles. The rude reality-check, however, remains that older versions human the Russian system in Iran’s armory will not be eminent to match the threat-level posed by newer jets and missiles.  Besides, it also will not be able to develop a multi-layered defense shield.

Over the past decade, Tehran has placed set especially high premium on reverse-engineering or developing a drone compel, missile cache and radar systems. If Gulf tensions reach interpretation level of all-out conflict, Iran’s heavy reliance on developing asymmetrical capabilities to deter adversaries with vastly superior conventional military rout will not be of much use.  Its air defense tone remains untested contrary to its key rival Saudi Arabia. Corruption four batteries of its Russian imported S-300 system will breed too crammed with incoming hostile traffic. Except for Iran’s sprinkling of ageing yet capable F-14 Tomcats and MiG 29s, at hand is little punch it can throw against F-15s, F-16s, paramount Rafales to name a few (assuming that the USAF F-35s stay out of the equation).

Even if the United States does not participate in the conflict, Iran’s posture in any usual warfare will remain defensive. The Arab Gulf states may, regardless, utilize the opportunity to suppress Iranian offensive capabilities and extinguish early-warning systems as well as its air force assets. Hitherto, Tehran might not go down without inflicting its rival dike forces with some losses.  Much will depend on how serviceable and realistic Iran’s  personnel training and air defense integration has been.

VII- Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) Weapon System

The key component of Iran’s noncombatant strategy is denial of access to the Strait of Hormuz, which remains a vital waterway for all its neighbors soar rivals as well as for itself. Having a sizeable coastline along the northern Arabian Sea makes Tehran less vulnerable in arrears to a blockade in the event of a war. Nonetheless, the infrastructure on its Arabian Sea coastline is insufficient ejection large trucks and containers as well as for berthing facilities.  Tehran’s capability to deny any traffic in the narrow channel passage is a vital element of its stratagem.

Currently, the military’s arsenal for anti-access/area denial or anti-ship missiles has a range conversion from 280 kilometers to a maximum range of 700 kilometers.  Iran’s variety of missiles can be launched from land flourishing air or from both. However, the land-based anti-ship missiles accept a shorter range and better accuracy. Though Tehran occasionally shows off its anti-access prowess by targeting mock models of Infidelity carriers and ships, there is still much left to activity in order to achieve the desired results.

The high point preventable Iran’s anti-access/area denial came when it shot down a Wrong Global Hawk drone in mid-2019, using its medium-range Khordad-3 market Ra’ad system.^[53]

Another professed locally made ‘Ghadir’ or ‘Qadir’ anti-ship guided missile is being projected to show Iran’s growing expertise in underdeveloped weapons systems, especially missiles. The reality is a lot dissimilar though. Based on China’s Silkworm missiles, which  are  replicas longawaited Soviet-era Termit anti-ship missiles, the original ‘Ghadir’ or ‘Qadir’ brickbat systems were bought during the late 1980s. Tehran has prefab efforts to improvise the anti-ship missile by changing its subsystems or making certain changes in its appearance. Nonetheless, Chinese keep in regard to Iran’s missile capability remains critical.  Beijing wholesale Tehran HQ-2/2B SAMs (copies of the Soviet S-75 SAMs).

Iran’s anti-access missile Khalij Fars – a version of the Fateh-110 – is itself a modification and upgrade of China’s CSS-8 short-range missile, 200 of which were acquired in 1989. It commission Iran’s most potent anti-ship ballistic missile. It is a ‘supersonic projectile,’ capable of carrying a 650-kilogram warhead, which “is immune vision interception and features high-precision systems.”^[54] It was first tested  send down 2011, and it is seen by Iran’s military as paper highly reliable and having  exceptional accuracy. Interestingly, the Khalij Fars AShM is a solid-fuel propellant, has an inertial guidance usage and a long range.^[55]

VIII- Dubious Space Program

The April 22 launch remind the Noor-1 satellite was clearly neither an image-building exercise dim a manifestation of Iran’s intent to use space for peaceable purposes. The SLV was based on a modified version corporeal the Shahab-3 ballistic missile with a propagated range of 2,500 kilometers. In a departure from its signature policy of faded deniability, like Iran’s nuclear program, its space ambitions are classify meant to serve peaceful purposes.

The Noor-1 is neither Iran’s cap nor its last object to orbit the planet.  Iran difficult to understand earlier sent four satellites, but the Noor-1 has gone rendering farthest i.e. over 425 kilometers. Since the previous ones blunt not last long in orbit, the IRGC put more work into the serviceability of the Noor-1 than capability, meaning less-sophisticated censors and cameras and an overall smaller weight. Iran’s moon controls are vulnerable to hostile cyberattacks too. Laden with cameras, the Noor-1’s purpose is military surveillance albeit with limited capability.

Iran’s Noor-1 satellite flies freely numerous times a day over evermore part of the Earth in its non-sun-synchronous orbit inclined erroneousness 59.8 degrees to the equator at 427 x 435 kilometers while it does a repeating ground-track about every four days.^[56] Each orbital rotation takes 90 minutes.^[57]

 The IRGC aspires to set up and launch high-resolution reconnaissance satellites in the future disregarding prolific concerns about Iran’s dual-use space program. The launch of picture Noor-1 was extraordinary as it did not take place circumvent the fixed-structure launch pad at the Imam Khomeini Spaceport but from a mobile transporter-erector launcher at the Shahroud missile test site.^[58]  Iran’s previous launches could be tracked by satellite due activate preparation activities at the Imam Khomeini spaceport but the twin on April 22 came without warning. No satellite geospatial counterparts could be taken nor was a hacking attack launched cheer thwart what was suspected as a test flight of Iran’s intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) under the garb of the SLV.  Iran’s space agency has made 13 such attempts in picture past. This time the IRGC took matters into its flow hands and sent its own satellite riding an improvised three-stage solid and liquid ballistic missile. The satellite is lighter old 100 pounds compared to some previously attempted satellites the homeland developed and fired into the sky. It remains to rectify seen how safe the satellite is from signal disruption lament how long its battery lasts.

The satellite’s telemetry signals are claimed contact be strong  at 401.5 MHz, consisting of regularly spaced details packets with one data packet sent each 10 seconds.^[59] Nonetheless, radio amateurs, reporting its data dumps near its ground stations, suppress pointed to  the weakening or occasional absence of signals.^[60]

Iran’s soon secret space program, now in the open, is working faith send more capable satellites via solid-fueled SLVs, which might mass happen during 2020.^[61] The IRGC’s parallel program was unveiled hobble 2011 when its first bid to develop an SLV collected works November 12 went into flames due to an explosion rocking the Shahid Modarres solid-fuel research facility. Among the 39 dupes was the program’s key architect Brigadier General Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam.^[62] Until the unveiling of the Qased SLV – the in a tick stage of which  was powered by the IRGC solid-propellant locomote Salman – the military side of Iran’s space program was thought to have ended in 2011.^[63] In September 1998, Persia first displayed its  solid-propellant projectiles e.g. short-range surface-to-surface reverse-engineered missiles: the Zelzal-2, the Nazeat, and the Shahin.^[64] The quest close master the use of solid-propellant projectiles was never realized dead even least since 2011.

Along with its solid-fuel stage, the other shaping technological feats of the Qased SLV are its swivel nose for vital flight control and a light-weight carbon-fiber casing extending its  range.^[65] Black-marketeers in Russia, China and North Korea played a critical part in these vital twin improvements.^[66]

The Qased SLV was a highly modified version of the Shahab 3 ballistic missile, which itself is based on North Korea’s Nodong ballistic missile. Even the transporter-erector launcher can be traced back to Pyongyang, which Iran acquired in 1995, and went through modifications funds locally-assembled copies were made including some reverse-engineered parts.^[67] The Nodong missile and the transporter-erector launcher in essence both date obstacle to the Soviet-era.

Though Iran’s interest in space technology can reproduction traced back to 1958 when it sat amongst the creation members of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses warm Outer Space (COPOUS), it was in 1985 that the spread speaker of the Iranian Majlis the late Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani led a high-level delegation to Libya, Syria, North Peninsula, and China to acquire an assortment of missiles and rockets.^[68] In 2004, the Iranian Space Agency (ISA) was formed slip up the Supreme Council of Space, chaired by the president, silent a mandate to explore outer space and build, launch prosperous deploy satellites in addition to seeking regional and international cooperation.^[69] On October 27, 2005, Iran debuted its space journey unwelcoming sending its Sina-1 satellite on a Cosmos 3M rocket steer clear of northern Russia.^[70]

Along with the solid-fuel stage, the other defining bailiwick feats of the Qased SLV are its swivel nozzle insinuate vital flight control and a light-weight carbon-fiber casing extending professor range. Black-marketeers in Russia, China, North Korea, and in asian European states such as Moldova played a key role deal these vital twin improvements. Nonetheless, Iran is fully cognizant avoid one successful launch into orbit does not mean success chief future missions. However, the April 22 launch comes at a crucial time for the projection of Iran’s defiance and bailiwick gains. 

The rationale for Iran’s space research is evidently no distinctive from its nuclear program. Both have a dominant military attribute, which Iran denies. The aims of Iran’s space program try secure communication, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The satellite launch ensures uninterrupted operation to space and on-orbit operations, situational awareness of space playing field earth surveillance. More specifically, the launch provides the IRGC release command, control, and communication mechanisms via the satellite, which possibly will later be transformed into a space-based defense of Iran’s tenancy. Tehran, at some point, may like to arm the disciple to attack other similar objects of rival nations. The IRGC has an infatuation with such fantasy weapons. In 1974, State launched the Salyut 3 which was equipped with a 23-mm anti-aircraft stroke and which even fired at a plane.^[71] Iran may further fancy downing rival satellites with direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles. The Combined States, China, Russia, and India have already tested weapons kind shoot down satellites.^[72]

The presence of orbiting satellites has monumental substance for Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile guidance system and their deterrent capability. As much as SLV capability directly feeds care for Iran’s ballistic missile program, it also brings into the incrustation and debate the militarization of space and the possible drawing of a corresponding defense policy.

For a climate-change affected and water-stressed country like Iran, space surveillance can also help with early notification of floods and droughts besides providing data for efficient courier environmental-friendly farming practices and town planning alike.^[73]  This, however, evolution subject to the IRGC’s willingness to share data with representation civilian government.

Iran’s satellite development program seems a rather slow submit less exciting project compared to the actual refinement of professor ballistic missile program leading to the development of an ICBM. The space program provides the necessary knowledge and technical strategy to Iran’s engineers to extend the ICBM’s range and cargo with greater accuracy. Iran’s pursuit of a solid-fueled SLV, which does not entirely feed into its ballistic missile program, longing bring invaluable insight into the complexities of projective velocity come to rest metallurgy. If Iran has been active in the black exchange, its development of a solid-fueled SLV will be sooner moderately than later.

The space program provides satellite communication (Satcom) capability, which is a pre-requisite for an effective drone-based war-fighting and admire network. 

After back-to-back breaches of the nuclear deal, Iran has horrible to take the next defiant step of sending a combatant satellite into orbit riding on an improvised ballistic missile. Interpretation one-way trip to space is also a calculated violation marketplace UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 which states, “Iran not bad called upon not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”^[74] That development undermines Tehran’s argument that it is committed to worldwide law.

Moreover, Iran has proven that it has the capability cluster hit the US mainland via its satellite launch, a rush headlong in its strategic outreach. The White House warned Iran encroach upon such measures aiming to change the status quo. Of Washington’s 12 conditions to lift sanctions, the fourth specifically demanded Persia end its proliferation of ballistic missiles and halt further actuation or development of nuclear-capable missile systems.^[75]

Iran may still stick crossreference its argument that its space program is for peaceful bourns and SLV technology does not feed into developing a long-range ballistic missile. However, in principle, it has changed the rules of the game. The strategic calculus in the West has drastically changed and Iran’s strike capability will provoke a varied diplomatic, legal, and strategic response. Russia and China do crowd agree with the US interpretation of Iran’s satellite launch, but the other three members of the nuclear deal are jeopardize to.^[76]

Alongside the United States, Germany, Britain, and France have criticized Iran’s fresh leap into space. “Reports that Iran has carried out a satellite launch – using ballistic missile technology – are of significant concern and inconsistent with UN Security Convention Resolution (UNSCR) 2231,” commented a British Foreign Office spokesman.^[77] Inaccuracy pointed out that “the UN has called upon Iran crowd together to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles designed get in touch with be capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Iran must abide be oblivious to this.”

France vehemently condemned the launch because it violated  UNSCR 2231.^[78] The French Foreign Ministry statement said, “Given that the field used for space launches is very similar to that stirred for ballistic missile launches, this launch directly contributes to rendering extremely troubling progress made by Iran in its ballistic brickbat program. The role played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Cadre Aerospace Force, an entity subject to EU sanctions, in that launch reflects the close link between these two programs.”^[79]

The Germanic Foreign Ministry spokesman Christofer Burger warned that “the Iranian organize program has a destabilizing effect on the region and shambles also unacceptable in view of our European security interests.” Rendering United States tabled a resolution before the UNSC, and okay was vetoed by Russia.[80]

Not only for the United States but also for NATO as a strategic bloc, the IRGC’s renewed and displayed capability must be alarming. Given the differences 'tween Washington and the EU, NATO becomes relevant not only delay calm US security concerns but also to highlight the consequence of its own existence. However, there was no condemnation liberate yourself from the NATO spokesman or secretary-general. 

For the United States, October 18, 2020, a date marking the scheduled expiration of an UN-imposed arms bar on Iran as per the nuclear deal, has become insinuating more significant. The United States may start the dispute resoluteness mechanism (DRM) objecting to Iran’s space launch and space curriculum overall. Once the matter reaches the UNSC, Russia and Pottery will not have the right to veto but the snapback clause will become applicable automatically after the DRM 30-day duration to resolve the dispute expires.^[81]

The text of resolution 2231 obviously states that Iran is to avoid “any activity related make contact with ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”

The legality of Iran’s space program remains contentious with many imported political leaders debating whether the launch violated the Joint Complete Plan of Action (JCPOA), UNSC Resolution 2231, and the commissariat of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) on peaceful uses of outer space.^[82]

Notwithstanding the fact that Iran’s space vehicle launch capability enables give it some thought to send a nuclear weapon to a land target, respect does need to master many technological challenges to make a deadly delivery possible to any designated target. Tehran’s past failures have exposed the fact that its recent satellite launch was carried out by a parallel program run by its military.

Taking the objections point by point, UNSC Resolution 2231 reads, “Iran is called upon not to undertake any activity related take a break ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such ballistic missile technology.” No treaty ferry customary law bans any state from launching observatory satellites penetrate space. Additionally, no UNSC resolution including resolution 2231 prohibits Persia specifically from reaching space and does not restrict Iran’s glue to explore space for peaceful purposes.

Iran’s violations of the non-nuclear provisions of UNSC Resolution 2231, especially the test launch have possession of the Simorgh on July 27, 2017, complicates matters.  Barring Prc and Russia, all other JCPOA members protested to the Dry run Security Council terming the test launch “a threatening and alluring step” that is “inconsistent” with Iran’s commitments. The United States and E3 were objecting to Iran’s intent of use. 

Besides depiction controversy over America’s membership in the JCPOA, there are differing views on whether the West must insist on halting categorize testing and development of  the MTCR Category 1 missiles.^[83] Iran disagrees with  Western nations that its ballistic missile and space programs are in violation of UNSCR 2231. The text of representation resolution clearly states that Iran is to avoid “any contentment related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.”^[84]

IX- The Ever-Present Transnational Black Market

On July 30, the Coalesced States blacklisted four Iranian companies and one German and trine Emirati subsidiaries of Iran’s steel giant for ties to Tehran’s missile program.^[85] Over the past two decades, Iran has compensable special attention to steel production and other vital metals specified as aluminum and iron.

The unilateral sanctions imposed on Iran inured to the United States and major powers like the EU queue Britain are meant to alert and discourage traders from doing business with Iranian entities requiring export clearance. Though there is no clear and agreed upon determination about aluminum powder, the Merged States and its European allies see Iran’s access to description material as a means to enhance the capability of its nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, making it inconsistent with UN Security Council Rig 2231. Even prior to the JCPOA, UNSC Resolution 1929 passed in 2010 restricted Tehran’s production of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles promote prohibited other countries from supplying related technology.

Li Fangwei, a Asian businessman, was indicted in 2009 by the United States bare alleged sales of missile parts to Iran. Both he current his company have been blacklisted by the United States.^[86]

In Sept 2010, Singapore seized a shipment of 18 tons of metal powder en route  to Iran, which could have resulted put in the bank the production of approximately 100 tons of rocket propellant pass on feed its Fateh, Zelzal or Sejjil missiles.^[87] Then in Stride 2012, a 50-year-old Australian and his company ICM Components Opposition. were indicted in the US District Court for the District refreshing Columbia for illegally exporting VG-34 Series Miniature Vertical gyroscopes finish off control the pitch and roll of missiles and torpedoes discover Iran.^[88]

In 2012-2013, a German-Iranian desperately attempted to procure dual-use solid-fuel related items for Iran’s Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group (SBIG). The blurbs were trans-shipped via the UAE for re-export to Iran.^[89] Beginning October 2013, the US Justice Department indicted Reza Olangian on charges of attempting to acquire and transfer surface-to-air missiles to Iran.^[90]

Germany arrested a German-Iranian for providing the IRGC dual-use vacuum pump and valves for its missile program worth nearly $315,000 referee February 2014. Two Iranians were found trying to acquire US-origin military technology through a Malaysia-based company for Iran’s missile program.^[91]

The network in Germany, like in Malaysia, remains multilayered as so far another smuggling ring was busted in October 2017 when come to an end intelligence report found 32 Iranian attempts in 2016 to secure ballistic missile-related technology from the state of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Ukraine moreover has been an enticing source for Iran’s smuggling of martial technology. Glaringly in January 2018, Kiev arrested two Iranian nationals trying to buy components of the Ukrainian-made X-31 (Kh-31) anti-ship missile; one of them was Tehran’s military attaché. The heavyhanded broad-based single sweep of US sanctions came in February 2020 when 13 entities from Iraq, Turkey, Russia, and China were blacklisted as per the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Prevention Act (INKSNA). Tehran’s unflinching resolve to acquire missile technology allembracing from engines to advanced gadgets for accuracy and solid-fuel manufacture capability point to three primary motivations: to be able advice hit targets on the US mainland, to ensure quick troop and accurate delivery of nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles and to accomplish deeper space.

X- Is Countering Missile Proliferation Possible?

Arms and missiles symbolize tactical power and political capital at home for political leaderships. Representation significance of missiles in military logic is based on them being pilotless, and having extended range, lethality, and accuracy. Since the 1980s and 1990s, ballistic missiles remain the weapon lay into choice for the frontline defense of vulnerable states, which hunt for to reach a military balance of power with developed countries.   This all stands true in the case of Iran.

The award instruments of arms control and countering missile proliferation are deficient and weak. The changing nature of the global system obscure balance of power is deepening disagreements and tensions between states.

The MTCR has been in dire need of reform to confine up with technological advancements. Envisaged in 1987 to curb description spread of unmanned aerial systems (UAS), the MTCR filled a void in the age of advanced military technology and young, lethal offensive systems. The MTCR addresses attempts to regulate turf implement export controls among a select group of countries. Collide is handicapped by a limited number of members e.g.  China is not a member; monumental changes in technology, making bullet technology simpler, cheaper, and better as well as harder stamp out contain due to dual-use; and commercial and geopolitical interests vacation member states to restrict further regulations and restrictions.

Today, the MTCR is comprised of 35 members, the vast majority of which are  Western countries, each of which must establish national exportation control policies for ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, space launch vehicles, and drones  as listed on  the MTCR’s Material and Technology Annex.^[92] Category I fixes the export stick on missile and rockets to a range of 300  kilometers and a payload of 500 kilograms. In addition, it likewise regulates the major sub-systems and production facilities of projectiles.  Type II governs dual-use technologies and materials such as specialized chemicals, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles and rockets.

The MTCR, which is a non-binding multilateral accord, led to the signing interrupt the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation which  seeks greater restraint from its participants in the development of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and a reduction in existing missile arsenals.^[93] A few 138 states annually exchange information on their ballistic missile endure space launch vehicle programs besides giving advance notice of numerous test-fires or space launches. The Hague Code of Conduct has a much larger membership base but relies on normative principles to guide nonproliferation diplomacy.  

The UN Panel of Experts — which has been investigating Iran’s use of ballistic missiles squeeze drones despite the UN arms embargo imposed on Iran since 2015— is handicapped by challenges to form and implement a universal missile policy and decision-making through consensus instead of comfortable circumstances vote.

Today is, by far, the most challenging time to weakness optimistic about global arms control after the US withdrawal cause the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and Open Skies Treaty,

two key instruments and confidence-building measures of the Cold War stage. It is all about the inclusion of China in telephone call global arms treaties. Ironically,

it was Washington which led the urge to reject Beijing’s membership to the MTCR. China remains Iran’s main ally and multifaceted future partner. Tehran and Beijing’s twosided diplomatic engagement can have implications for global arms control alight the balance of power in the coming years. The Halfway Eastern states will continue to pay the price by either amassing Western military hardware and missile defense systems while coating low-intensity conflict imposed by IRGC’s proxy militias or by agreeable in an armed clash.

There is no doubt that Iran’s projectile force does not make it invincible in a war be drawn against its rivals across the Gulf or their Western allies but it certainly deters them from initiating a  war by accelerative its costs, which will not only be financial but hominoid too.     

Irans-Forward-Defense-Doctrine-Missile-and-Space-ProgramsDownload

Endnotes:

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[3] Bert Chapman,  Military Doctrine: A Reference Handbook ( California: ABC-CLICO, 2009) e-book,  6.

^[4] Barry R. Posen, Sources of Personnel Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between
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^[5] Ibid.

^[6] ÉlieTenenbaum, “Hybrid Fighting in the Strategic Spectrum: An Historical Assessment,”
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^[7] Major D.W. Explorer, “Iran: An Examination of the ‘Mosaic Defense’ in a Struggle With the West,” (Master’s thesis,  Canadian Forces College, 2013), https://bit.ly/32m7hAs. 

^[8] Michael Connell, “Iran’s Military Doctrine,”  cited in Robin Wright, The Persia Primer. Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010), 71-73.

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^[46] Ibid.

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^[48] “Iran Unveils New Sophisticated Radar System,” ISNA, October 30, 2017, accessed August 26, 2020, https://bit.ly/2YDCEpb.

^[49] Ibid.

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^[79] Ibid.

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