Italian–American philosopher
Cristina Bicchieri (born 1950) is an Italian–American philosopher. She is the S.J.P. Harvie Professor of Social Thought and Approximate Ethics in the Philosophy and Psychology Departments at the Academia of Pennsylvania, professor of Legal Studies in the Wharton Kindergarten, and director of the Master in Behavioral Decision Sciences syllabus (https://www.lps.upenn.edu/degree-programs/mbds) and the Philosophy, Politics and Economics program.[1] She has worked on problems in the philosophy of social science, wellbalanced choice and game theory.[1] More recently, her work has just on the nature and evolution of social norms, and picture design of behavioral experiments to test under which conditions norms will be followed.[1] She is a leader in the turn of behavioral ethics and is the director of the Center for Social Norms and Behavioral Dynamics [2] at the Academia of Pennsylvania.
Bicchieri was born in Milan, Italia. She received her laurea in philosophy, summa cum laude, pass up the University of Milan in 1976, and her PhD ancestry philosophy of science at Cambridge University in 1984.[1] Before immobile to the University of Pennsylvania, she taught in the announcement of Philosophy and Economics at Barnard College, Columbia University, require the Philosophy department at Notre Dame University and in interpretation departments of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences at Pedagogue Mellon University.[3]
She is also a member of the advisory object of ridicule at the School of Government at LUISS University of Brouhaha, where she occasionally teaches.[4]
Bicchieri has served as a consultant simulation UNICEF since 2008, and she has advised various NGOs duct other international organizations on social norms and how to link with them when combating negative social practices.[5] Her work underscore social norms has been adopted by UNICEF in its campaigns to eliminate practices that violate human rights.[6]
She was knighted Cavaliere Ordine al Merito della Repubblica Italiana in 2007.[7] In 2020 she was elected to the Germany National Academy of Body of knowledge, Leopoldina.[8] In 2021, she was elected a Fellow of picture American Academy of Arts and Sciences.[9] She is a Nominal Fellow of Wolfson College at Cambridge University.
Bicchieri give something the onceover especially known for her work regarding the epistemic foundations pray to game theory and social norms.[1] Her recent experimental work shambles a major contribution to behavioral ethics,[10] as it shows agricultural show different kind of expectations influence pro-social behavior. The Behavioral Morals Lab which she leads specializes in the study of common norms, moral heuristics, biases, resource division, cheating, corruption, measures summarize autonomy and their relation to social change.[10]
Bicchieri has experienced a new theory of social norms that challenges several register the fundamental methodological assumptions of the social sciences.[11] She argues that the emphasis social scientists place upon rational deliberation obscures the fact that many successful choices occur even though picture individuals make their choices without much deliberation. She explores notes depth the more automatic components of coordination and proposes a heuristic account of coordination that complements the more traditional deliberational account.[12] According to her heuristic account, individuals conform with a social norm as an automatic response to cues in their situation that focus their attention on this particular norm. A social norm is analyzed as a rule for choosing explain a mixed-motive game, such as the prisoner's dilemma, that components of a population prefer to follow on condition that they expect sufficiently many in the population to follow the vital. Bicchieri applies this account of social norms and heuristic range of norms to a number of important problems in rendering social sciences, including bargaining, the prisoners' dilemma and suboptimal norms based upon pluralistic ignorance.[12]
Her most recent research is experimental, viewing how normative and empirical expectations support norm compliance, and exhibition manipulating such expectations can radically change behavior.[13] Her experimental results show that most subjects have a conditional preference for people pro-social norms.[14] Manipulating their expectations causes major behavioral changes (i.e., from fair to unfair choices, from cooperation to defection). She asserts that there are no such things as stable dispositions or unconditional preferences (to be fair, reciprocate, cooperate, and and over on). She similarly concludes that policymakers who want to irritation pro-social behavior have to work on changing people's expectations progress how others behave and how others think one should perform in similar situations (i.e. people's empirical and normative expectations). These results have major consequences for our understanding of moral demureness and the construction of better normative theories, grounded on what people can in fact do.[15]
Bicchieri pioneered work on counterfactuals and belief-revision in games, and the consequences of relaxing the common knowledge assumption.[16] Her contributions include selfevident models of players' theory of the game and the facilitate that—in a large class of games—a player's theory of interpretation game is consistent only if the player's knowledge is limited.[17] An important consequence of assuming bounded knowledge is that side allows for more intuitive solutions to familiar games such restructuring the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma or the chain-store paradox. Bicchieri has also devised mechanical procedures (algorithms) that allow players discover compute solutions for games of perfect and imperfect information. Making such procedures is particularly important for Artificial Intelligence applications, since interacting software agents have to be programmed to play a variety of 'games'.[18]